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Ernst von Glasersfeld seems to say to
social constructivists, “You attribute reality to
society, but your society is just another con-
struct, all you know is just the bits of light and
shadow and color that your visual system pro-
vides to you.” Now, “society” is just a big word
for “other people.” I can give to this text of von
Glasersfeld’s either a short answer or a long
one.
Here’s the short answer. Von Glasersfeld is
skeptical about whether I exist, but he is sure
that he is skeptical about that. Moreover, he is
sure that I should be skeptical about whether
he exists, and that I ought to be quite sure
about that.
If that is too quick and easy, then here is a
longer answer. 
The problem for philosophy of mathe-
matics is mathematical certainty. Everybody
seems to be quite sure that, for example, the
sum of the squares on the sides of a Euclidean
right triangle equals the square on the side of
the hypotenuse. But our ordinary everyday
knowledge and our empirical scientific
knowledge all seems to involve at least some
slight tiny modicum of dubitability. How can
we be so absolutely sure of mathematical
truth? Formalists say, “These so-called math
truths are just empty symbolism.” Platonists
say, “They are perceptions of transcendental
eternal inhuman realities.” Some, like me,
say, “They are about concepts, which are
socially held and historical. Therefore, ques-
tions about the nature of mathematical truth
come down to questions about human think-
ing, at the social level, and have to be studied
as empirical problems about thought and
culture and even about the brain itself.”
Now, it would be presumptuous of me to
put words into the mouth of von Glasersfeld,
so instead of imagining what he might say, let
me reason as a hypothetical “social construc-
tivist” philosopher of mathematics who is
actually convinced by the radical construc-
tivism (really, Humean skepticism) of von
Glasersfeld. 
“Aha! I have been trying to ground the
reality of the Euclidean triangle in the reality
of the text book, the classroom, and the con-
sensus of the mathematical world. But now I
see! I have no right to assume there is a math-
ematical world, or even a classroom, or even
a text book. I only know these lights and
darks and colors, that I hypothetically imag-
ine may perhaps come from some conjec-
tured reality that I myself have constructed
into a text or a classroom or whatever!
Instead of explaining the nature of mathe-
matical knowledge, I now understand that
mathematical knowledge itself is merely
another construct! This may be of little or no
use to me as a teacher, a student, or a
researcher. But it will certainly be of great
help if I am ready to give up any interest in
teaching, studying, or researching.”
Skeptical Mathematics?
Reuben Hersh
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Preamble
As Ernst von Glasersfeld has reminded us
many times in many publications and presen-
tations, what is written here “…does not pur-
port to describe a real world, but merely pro-
poses a model of how one could imagine
knowledge to be built up” (§42, emphasis in the
original). To bring up the point that what is
written by a radical constructivist, such as von
Glasersfeld, myself or others, is not an asser-
tion of truth runs the risk that George Lakoff
suggests in the title of his book Don’t think of
an elephant (Lakoff 2004). To read the sen-
tence is to do the very thing one is invited not
to do. But, it seems, for realists, indeed anyone
subjected to a life experience growing up in a
realist society, one can hardly help associating
what someone has written with attributions
of truth on the part of the author. Since such
associations are incessantly, but subtly and
implicitly, cultivated in the minds of all in cul-
tures such as the one we live in, the only way
to become independent of such reflexive asso-
ciations is to wrestle with them explicitly.
What follows is offered as an alternative
explanation of the nature and status of the
concept of society. This alternative is entirely
compatible with radical constructivism as
described elsewhere by von Glasersfeld (1995,
1999) and some others. This is not a claim of
the truth-value of this alternative interpreta-
tion, but instead is no more and no less than a
claim that there is an alternative explanation
that fits and is useful. It is not even a claim of
primacy or superiority in some comparative
sense. It is merely the claim that this alterna-
tive explanation of the nature and status of the
concept of society exists, is viable, and is com-
patible with radical constructivism: a radical
constructivist’s explanation of “society.”
The nature of knowledge of society
My claim is that, at a certain level, asking
“Where do our notions of society ‘come
from’?”, “Where do our notions of love ‘come
from’?” and “Where do our notions of force
‘come from’?” are all equivalent questions, in
particular with regard to von Glasersfeld’s
claim to offer a theory of rational knowing
(§46). In answering such questions, we
encounter the nature and status of “society,”
“love,” and “force.” My claim is that the nature
and status of these three, as things we think
about, are essentially the same. 
Science is one field that attempts to prac-
tice the construction of rational knowledge.
In his book on concepts at the foundations of
physics, Max Jammer (1957, p. 2) provides an
intelligible account of what he calls the
“objectives” of science: “its two major assign-
ments are the description of certain phenom-
ena in the world of experience and the estab-
lishment of general principles for their
prediction and what might be called their
‘explanation’.”
In this description Jammer seems to be
saying that one can explain science as carrying
out its program using two types of knowl-
edge: experiential and explanatory. Scientists
are trying to formulate rational, naturalistic
explanations for specified sets of experiences,
which meet certain conditions. This depic-
tion in terms of experiential and explanatory
knowledge is entirely compatible with radical
constructivism as von Glasersfeld describes it,
e.g., in Glasersfeld (1995, 1999).
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This enterprise is really not so unique to
science. Human beings strive to formulate
rational explanations for experience in many
intellectual fields and in everyday experience.
(This is not to claim construction of rational
explanation is the whole of human cognition,
but just that it is one of the activities we dis-
tinguish in what we call human cognition.)
Differences may lay in qualifications placed
on the set of experiences or the quality and
rigor of the explanation, but the underlying
enterprise is the same. 
Jammer goes on to describe the “appara-
tus” used in science to carry out its “assign-
ments.”
“For the efficient achievement of these two
objectives science employs a conceptual
apparatus, that is, a system of concepts and
theories that represent or symbolize the
data of sense experience, as pressures, col-
ors, tones, odors, and their possible inter-
relations. This conceptual apparatus con-
sists of two parts: (1) a system of concepts,
definitions, axioms, and theorems, form-
ing a hypothetico-deductive system, as
exemplified in mathematics by Euclidean
geometry; (2) a set of relations linking cer-
tain concepts of the hypothetico-deduc-
tive system with certain data of sensory
experience” (Jammer 1957, p. 2).
What does Jammer’s explanation of the
nature of science have to do with our ques-
tions about society, love and force? I shall
begin by asking, “How do we identify when
two people are in love?” When pressed, most
people answer with something like: “You can
tell by the way the two act.” In other words, we
draw the conclusion that love is present based
on observable behavior. Do we see love or do
we see the observable behavior? Where does
the love come in? Love is our explanation for
the observed behavior. The observable behav-
ior is experiential knowledge. Love is the
explanation that subsumes this observable
behavior. In this sense can we see love? Not
really. Love is a concept in explanatory knowl-
edge and as such is “the free creation of the
human mind.” (Einstein & Infeld 1938) As
explanation, love is present in the human
mind, not out there in the external world.
The same applies to “force.” Do we mea-
sure force? Not really. We quantify effects that
we explain are due to force. Using strain
gauges, we quantify the change in electrical
properties of objects that deform. We explain
that the deformation is due to force. We use
the measured change in the electrical prop-
erty of a strain gauge and our explanatory
knowledge to compute the magnitude and
direction of a force. Both the measured
change in electrical property and our explan-
atory system for force are necessary for the
computation. In other settings, we measure
the motion of an object. We explain that the
motion of objects has a certain relationship to
force. With this explanation we can use the
measured motion of an object to compute the
magnitude and direction of a force. We do not
measure or observe force itself. We compute
the magnitude and direction of force from
specified experiences based on our hypothet-
ico-deductive explanatory system involving
the concept, force, and links to the specified
experiences.
In this sense both love and force have the
same nature and status. They are both con-
cepts in explanatory knowledge. Each is used
to explain a specified set of experiential
knowledge. We select specific elements of
experiential knowledge to link, in ways of our
own choosing, with aspects of the explanation
for these experiences. We cannot see or mea-
sure love or force because they exist only in
our minds as explanations for things we can
see or measure.
As concepts, which exist only in our
minds, that we use to explain to ourselves ele-
ments of our experience and to make predic-
tions, love and force do not exist physically to
be transmitted from one person to another.
Hence, as a consequence, in the radical con-
structivist explanation, each of us can only
construct our own concepts of love and force
that we modify or refine in order to reach a
better fit to the experiences they are intended
to explain. 
So, how about society? Is it experiential
knowledge or is it explanatory knowledge?
Society is the explanation of a specific body of
experience parsed from the manifold of expe-
riences we have and believe others have. In the
case of society, one inescapable aspect of the
fit we strive to achieve is a kind of agreement
with others with regard to the explanation. As
von Glasersfeld put it:
“Put in the simplest way, to understand
what someone has said or written means
no less, but also no more, than to have
built up a conceptual structure that, in the
given context, appears to be compatible
with the structure the speaker had in
mind. And this compatibility, as a rule,
manifests itself in no other way than that
the receiver says and does nothing that
contravenes the speaker’s expectations”
(§28). 
Society, as an explanation, is constructed
by each of us in coordination with those oth-
ers we distinguish out of the manifold of our
experiences. By this radical constructivist line
of reasoning, employing a distinction
between experiential and explanatory knowl-
edge inspired by Jammer, the concept, society,
has the same status, nature and origins as the
concepts, love and force. The concept, society,
exists in minds and nowhere else.
Is it possible to give a different explana-
tion: one such as that of the social construc-
tivists? Certainly. Can productive use be made
of such an explanation? Certainly. But, from a
radical constructivist’s point of view, a posi-
tion in which society is taken as a given, mind-
independent reality that can be known to an
individual, is both not necessary and poten-
tially misleading. Not necessary, as demon-
strated in von Glasersfeld’s target article and
the present commentary. Potentially mislead-
ing in that it omits any attention to the origins
and genesis of explanatory knowledge of soci-
ety. A radical constructivist would hold that
even more productive use might be made of
an explanation of society consistent with rad-
ical constructivism.
For the radical constructivist, two more
questions arise. If an element of a mind-inde-
pendent reality can be known, in this case
society, how does coming to know it happen
and why only society? In the case of the
former question, we have not seen a success-
ful, convincing response to the challenge that
the Skeptics issued millennia ago. 
The second question has little meaning if
the first has not been answered. But, suspend-
ing that problem, if society is not an explana-
tion constructed by individuals in concert
with others, but exists as a mind-independent
reality and can be known to people as such,
then why not everything else? If everything
else can be known as such, then why use the
label “constructivist” if construction is not
necessary to know the world, either one part
or all of it?
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